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We consider cities which can increase the income of landowners or of
capital owners by improving the quality of public services. The improve-
ment can come from innovation or from imitation. We ﬁnd that when
cities aim to beneﬁt landowners, too many cities innovate; but too few
cities innovate when the city aims to beneﬁt capital owners. Redistribu-
tion across cities can ameliorate these ineﬃciencies.
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11 Introduction
Jurisdictions compete. A well-studied form of such competition involves taxes—
each jurisdiction may want to set taxes somewhat lower than do other jurisdic-
tions, aiming to attract residents (and so increase property values) or to attract
employers (and so increase wages). But jurisdictions can also compete in the
services they provide. This aspect of competition is less well-studied, and is the
concern of the current paper. To be concrete, we consider cities which at some
expense can adopt a policy that raises the productivity of capital in one city or
the other. Such an increase in the return to capital reallocates capital across
cities, and thereby aﬀects the return to land in the diﬀerent cities. These eﬀects
create spillovers or externalities across cities. We shall also consider a diﬀerent
externality, allowing one city to beneﬁt from a policy innovation adopted by
another city, perhaps by imitating a successful policy. We shall see that under
plausible conditions the cities may spend too much on innovation rather than
too little, or spend more than required to maximize aggregate welfare across the
cities. Our results are in some ways the opposite of those that appear under tax
competition. Under tax competition, cities lower taxes excessively, and provide
too few services. We show that cities may spend too much, or too early.
Our analysis can have several applications. We examine whether decentral-
ization promotes socially optimal policy innovation. Our result that maximizing
land values can lead to worse outcomes than maximizing the returns to capital
raises the possibility that expanded homeownership may lead to worse policies.
And we examine how the central government may be able to improve decentral-
ized decisions by redistributing income across cities.
Though we shall speak of innovation, the general ideas hold more broadly.
Instead of innovation, we can speak of experimentation, with a city adopting
a policy in one period, whose results become known to both cities. One city
can then learn from another. Another view is that a city can introduce a new
policy either in period 1 or in period 2. Adopting the policy in period 1 costs
F; the cost in period 2 is M < F. Then results similar to ours will hold—in
particular, when each city aims to maximize its land values, both cities may
adopt the policy in period 1, though social optimality requires that both do it
in period 2, or that only one city adopt it in period 1.
2 Literature
2.1 Race to the bottom
Strategic interaction among governments—how the policy in one jurisdiction
depends on what other jurisdictions do—is widely studied (for a survey see
Brueckner 2006). Our model considers the “resource-ﬂow” eﬀect, where the
distribution of resources (such as capital) across jurisdictions depends on the
policy choices of all jurisdictions. Most commonly studied is tax competition,
where a high tax on rich individuals encourages their migration, or where a
2high tax on capital reduces investment. In general, and in our model as well,
the Nash equilibrium in the resource-ﬂow model is ineﬃcient, with the details
of the model determining whether the decision variables are set too high or too
low.
Nevertheless, the standard story of policy in jurisdictions facing labor or
capital mobility is a “race to the bottom:” a jurisdiction which imposes more
onerous regulations or taxes on its citizens or ﬁrms will see movement out of the
jurisdiction, a fall in the tax base, and perhaps a need to raise tax rates further,
driving even more people out (see Peterson 1995, chapter 2). Jurisdictions may
face a prisoners’ dilemma, in which all would be better oﬀ if a central govern-
ment coordinated their policies; the desire to coordinate policies motivates, for
example, strengthening the European Union, and maintaining federal control in
the United States over welfare or environmental programs.
A clear statement of the argument, as applied to environmental policy, is
given by Stewart (1977)
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state
or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high en-
vironment standards that entail substantial costs for industry and
obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting en-
vironmental gains will be more than oﬀset by movement of capital
to other areas with lower standards. If each locality reasons in the
same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality
than they would prefer if there were some binding mechanism that
enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus elimi-
nating the threatened loss of industry or development.
2.2 Policy innovation and imitation
The idea that competition between governments can lead to political innova-
tions, and that decentralized government can lead to experimentation, is an old
one. In 1888 Bryce wrote that “Federalism enables a people to try experiments
in legislation and administration which could not be safely tried in a large cen-
tralized country. A comparatively small commonwealth like an American state
easily makes and unmakes its laws; mistakes are not serious, for they are soon
corrected; other states proﬁt by the experience of a law or a method which has
worked well or ill in the state that has tried it” (Bryce [1888] 2004, p. 257).
A half-century later, U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis saw states as
laboratories of democracy, writing in 1932 that “It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country” (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
at 311 (1932)).1
1Sometimes, of course, bad policies can be imitated. The California Fair Trade Law of 1931
was copied verbatim by ten other states, including two serious typographical errors (Walker
1971).
3In the academic literature, Oates (1999) speaks of “laboratory federalism”
and points out that welfare reform in the United States in 1996 followed these
considerations (see also Inman and Rubinfeld 1997).
Electoral considerations can strengthen the incentives for a local policymaker
to innovate. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006), building on Rose-Ackerman
(1980), show how the incentive to signal above-average ability to the electorate
can motivate politicians at the local level to implement new policies with un-
certain outcomes.
On the other hand, when outcomes are correlated across states, learning
involves an externality—the information obtained by one state can be used by
another, and therefore each policymaker has an incentive to free-ride on each
other’s innovative eﬀorts (Rose-Ackerman 1980 and Strumpf 2002). Scotchmer
(1991) ﬁnds that investment by jurisdictions is optimal for a given distribution
of land. But because of the negative spillover, this optimality may not hold for
innovations which can be imitated. Indeed, as in patent races, investment can
be excessive.
Empirical work addresses these ideas. One topic is whether some states
are more likely to innovate than are others. Walker (1969) ﬁnds that innova-
tion is more common in states with higher per capita income, higher levels of
education, and greater urbanization. But Gray (1973) argues that the charac-
teristics of jurisdictions poorly predict diﬀusion of policy, diﬀusion being largely
idiosyncratic.
Studying the post-World War II American occupation of Germany and Ger-
man reuniﬁcation after 1989, Jacoby (2001) concludes that imitation sparked
innovation in both periods. Schaltegger (2004) examines whether spending de-
cisions by one Swiss canton inﬂuence other cantons. The panel analysis provides
evidence of budget spillovers among neighboring cantons. Boehmke and Witmer
(2004) conduct an event-count study of Indian gaming. They consider diﬀusion
as arising both from social learning (oﬃcials in one state learn from the actions
of oﬃcials in neighboring states) and from economic competition (the actions
in one state increase another state’s beneﬁts of adopting the same policy).
2.3 Industrial Organization
The idea that imitation reduces innovation resembles results with patents—
the longer the patent the greater the incentive to innovate, but the lower the
diﬀusion (or use) of the innovation.
In the literature on industrial organization, Baake and Boom (2001) consider
ﬁrms’ incentives to produce compatible products. The incentives to innovate
rather than to imitate are studied by several authors. With a product-quality
ladder, one ﬁrm may want another to innovate because it allows the second to
innovate for the next stage (Scotchmer 1991). Glazer, Kannianen, and Mustonen
(2006) consider duopolists who invest in R&D and, when successful, produce a
new version of a product. They show that when products are network goods, the
producer of the old product may free-ride on another ﬁrm’s innovative eﬀorts.
43 Assumptions
Consider a dynamic game in which two cities compete for innovating better pub-
lic services. A city which innovates incurs a ﬁxed cost. The ﬁrst city to innovate
can enjoy higher land rents until the other city catches up. The follower city
can improve its public services by imitating the innovating city, thereby improv-
ing services at lower costs; this option discourages innovation. It is therefore
unclear whether dynamic competition in a decentralized economy leads to the
eﬃcient level of innovation. The plausible socially optimal outcome has one city
innovate and the other imitate. That is, innovation is socially valuable, but it
is wasteful for both cities to incur the costs of innovations.
Index the two cities by i. Output in a city increases with its capital (K),
land (L), and public services (G). Capital is mobile, land is immobile, and







where a and b are positive parameters. Let the price of capital in city i be ri;













Each city has one unit of land; that is, L1 = L2 = 1. The economy is endowed
with one unit of capital; a fraction k of it is in city 1, and a fraction 1 − k is
in city 2; that is, K1 = k and K2 = 1 − k. Each city has a unit measure of
land owners and a unit measure of capital owners. Land in each city is equally
owned by residents of that city. Capital across all cities is equally owned by the
total population; that is, the residents in each city own half the capital in their
city, and half the capital in the other city. The owners are immobile between
cities, while capital is mobile so that ri is equalized across the cities. From (1)




















where β = b
1−a. Payments for land are













The quantity of public services is ﬁxed, but the city can improve its quality
from bad to good by innovating or by imitating the innovation made by another
city. Normalize the ﬁxed quantity of public services to 1, and normalize the
5quality of public services before improvement to 1. Thus before city i improves
the quality of its public services, Gi = 1. A city which innovates can improve
its public service to Gi = 1 + g . Innovation costs F. A city can imitate an
innovation made by another city at a ﬁxed cost of M. A city which imitates
another city improves its public service to Gi = 1+γ, where γ < g. Transaction
costs are suﬃciently high so that in a decentralized solution the cities cannot
make side payments to each other to achieve the eﬃcient solution.
Let the rent on land in each city when both cities provide bad public services
be π(0,0); the return to capital is r(0,0). The corresponding values when both
cities innovate and provide good services are π(1,1) and r(0,0). Let π(1,0) and
r(1,0) denote the payments to land and capital in a city which has good public
services when the other city has bad services. And let π(0,1) and r(0,1) denote
the payments to land and capital in one city when that city provides bad public
services but the rival city provides good services. Let π(1,µ) and r(1,µ) denote
the payments to land and capital in the city which innovates but is imitated by
the other city; the corresponding values in the city which imitates are π(µ,1)
and r(µ,1). Since capital is mobile, r(1,0) = r(0,1) and r(1,µ) = r(µ,1). From
(3) and (4), express these as
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r(1,0) = r(0,1) = a
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r(1,µ) = r(µ,1) = a
 
(1 + g)β + (1 + γ)β1−a
.
We can see that π(0,1) < π(0,0) < π(1,1) < π(1,0) and π(0,1) < π(µ,1) <
π(1,1) < π(1,µ) < π(1,0) . Also, r(0,0) < r(1,0) = r(0,1) < r(1,µ) =
r(µ,1) < r(1,1).
6Consider an economy with three periods. Each city has bad services in
period 1, so that Gi1 = 1, πi1 = π(0,0), and ri1 = r(0,0). If city i innovates in
period 1, incurring the ﬁxed cost F in period 1, it has good public services in
periods 2 and 3. Otherwise, it has bad public services in period 2. A city which
did not innovate in period 1 can imitate in period 2 a city which did innovate
in period 1; fresh innovation is infeasible in period 2. Imitation costs M; the
quality of services in period 3 in the city which imitates is Gi = 1 + γ.
We shall consider two extreme cases of a city’s objective. It can either
maximize the return to landowners in the city, or alternatively it can maximize
the return to capital owners in the city.





δt(πit − Iit/2), (5)
where δ is the intertemporal discount factor, πit is the payment for land, πi1 =
π(0,0), and Iit is the investment by city i in period t. If instead city i maximizes




δt(rit/2 − Iit/2), (6)
where ri1 = r(0,0). We assume that in either case the tax to ﬁnance the costs
for innovation or imitation is levied equally on both land owners and capital
owners in each city.
4 Social welfare
The socially optimal solution, which maximizes aggregate welfare across the two
cities, can take one of three forms: no city innovates, both cities innovate, one
city innovates and the other imitates.
Let WFF denote social welfare, the sum of the incomes of landowners and
capital owners over all periods, when both cities innovate. From (5) and (6),
WFF = 2(π(0,0) + r(0,0)/2 − F) + 2δ (π(1,1) + r(1,1)/2)
+ 2δ2 (π(1,1) + r(1,1)/2).
(7)
Let WFM denote social welfare when only one city innovates in period 1, whereas
the other city imitates in period 2; let W0 denote social welfare when neither
city innovates. From (5), these are
WFM = (π(0,0) + r(0,0)/2 − F) + δ (π(1,0) + r(1,0)/2)
+ δ2 (π(1,µ) + r(1,µ)/2)
+ (π(0,0) + r(0,0)/2) + δ (π(0,1) + r(0,1)/2 − M)
+ δ2 (π(µ,1) + r(µ,1)/2),
(8)
7and
W0 = 2(π(0,0) + r(0,0)/2)+2δ (π(0,0) + r(0,0)/2) +2δ2 (π(0,0) + r(0,0)/2).
(9)
Equations (7), (8) and (9), imply that WFF exceeds W0 if
F ≤ δ(1 + δ)(π(1,1) − π(0,0)) + δ(1 + δ)(r(1,1) − r(0,0)). (10)
Similarly, WFM exceeds W0 if
F ≤ −δM + δ(π(1,0) − π(0,0)) + δ2(π(1,µ) − π(0,0))
− δ(π(0,0) − π(0,1)) − δ2(π(0,0) − π(µ,1))
+ δ(r(1,0) − r(0,0)) + δ2(r(1,µ) − r(0,0)).
(11)
And WFM exceeds WFF if
F ≥ δM + δ(π(1,1) − π(0,1)) + δ2(π(1,1) − π(µ,1))
− δ(π(1,0) − π(1,1)) − δ2(π(1,µ) − π(1,1))
+ δ(r(1,1) − r(1,0)) + δ2(r(1,1) − r(1,µ)).
(12)
Figure 1 shows the areas which satisfy (7), (8), and (9). We focus on the
outcomes when (11) and (12) hold; that is, the values of F and M lie in the
triangle enclosed by the borders of (11) and (12), and the vertical axis. Though
innovation is socially valuable, it will often prove wasteful for both cities to
incur the cost of innovating. Instead, at the socially optimal outcome one city
innovates in period 1 and the other imitates in period 2. One question we address
is whether a decentralized economy attains the socially optimal solution.
5 Nash equilibrium
5.1 A city maximizing the income of landowners
We consider ﬁrst each city maximizing land rents, or maximizing (5), given the
strategy of the rival city. Let Bt denote the maximized beneﬁts to a city from
period t on. The maximized beneﬁts are functions of the qualities of public
services in the two cities in the starting period t. In periods 2 and 3, this
economy has the following possible states: both cities provide good services
(with a payoﬀ denoted by Bt(1,1)); one city provides good services while the
other provides bad services; and both cities provide bad services (with a payoﬀ
denoted by Bt(0,0)). Let Bt(1,0) denote the maximized beneﬁts to a city
with good services when the other city has bad services; Bt(0,1) represents the
opposite case. In period 3, a possible outcome is that one city provides good
services while the other imitated it in period 2; the imitating city then provides
public services with quality Gi = 1 + γ. Let B3(1,µ) denote the maximized
beneﬁts to a city with better services; B3(µ,1) is the maximized beneﬁt to the
city that imitated the other city. The maximized beneﬁt in period 3, B3, is πi3.
8In period 1, both cities provide bad public services. Let B1(0,0) solve (5) with
πi0 = π(0,0).
To determine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, consider ﬁrst the game
between cities in period 2. Suppose both cities provide good public services in
period 2. Then B2(1,1) becomes
B2(1,1) = π(1,1) + δπ(1,1). (13)
Suppose next that only one city provides good services. The problem facing
the city with the bad services is to
max[π(0,1) + δB3(0,1),π(0,1) − M/2 + δB3(µ,1),
π(0,1) − F/2 + δB3(1,1)] = B2(0,1).
It chooses to imitate if
M + 2δ(π(1,1) − π(µ,1)) ≤ F, (14)
and
2δ(π(µ,1) − π(0,1)) ≥ M. (15)
Its beneﬁts are then
B2(0,1) = π(0,1) − M/2 + δB3(µ,1) = π(0,1) − M/2 + δπ(µ,1). (16)
Given that the city with initially bad services imitates the city with good ser-
vices, the beneﬁts to the city with good services are
max[π(1,0) + δB3(1,µ),π(1,0) − F/2 + δB3(1,µ)] = B2(1,0). (17)
The city’s optimal strategy is to do nothing, generating beneﬁts
B2(1,0) = π(1,0) + δπ(1,µ). (18)
Therefore, if (15) holds, the Nash equilibrium has the city with worse services
imitate. Their beneﬁts are (16) and (18).2
With (13), (16) and (18) in hand, we can turn to the original problem, (5),
where initially both cities have bad public services. Given that the rival city
innovates, a city’s optimization problem is to
max[π(0,0) − F/2 + δB2(1,1),π(0,0) + δB2(0,1)]B1(0,0). (19)
The city innovates if
F ≤ δM + 2δ(π(1,1) − π(0,1)) + 2δ2(π(1,1) − π(µ,1)). (20)
In contrast, when the rival city does not innovate, a city’s problem becomes
max[π(0,0) − F/2 + δB2(1,0),π(0,0) + δB2(0,0)] = B1(0,0).
2Equation (14) is plausible. The set of (F,M) which satisﬁes (15) includes the set which
satisﬁes (11) and (12).
9The city innovates if
F ≤ 2δ(π(1,0) − π(0,0)) + 2δ2(π(1,µ) − π(0,0)). (21)
Three equilibrium patterns are possible, depending on whether (20) and (21)
hold:3
1. Equation (21) holds and (20) does not hold. Then the Nash equilibrium
has only one city innovate. The beneﬁts to the city that innovates (say
city 1) are
π(0,0) − F/2 + δπ(1,0) + δ2π(1,µ).
The beneﬁts to the city that does not innovate are
π(0,0) + δπ(0,1) − δM/2 + δ2π(µ,1).
2. Equations (20) and (21) both hold. Then both cities innovate. The ben-
eﬁts are
π(0,0) − F/2 + δπ(1,1) + δ2π(1,1).
3. Neither (20) nor (21) holds. Then neither city innovates. The beneﬁts to
each are
π(0,0) + δπ(0,0) + δ2π(0,0).
In case 1, the social optimum is attained. In cases 2 and 3, however, the social
optimum is not attained. In case 2 too many cities innovate. In case 3 no city
innovates.4
Figure 2 shows the areas in which each of the three cases holds. We can see
that innovation tends to be excessive. If city A innovates while city B imitates,
then city B has lower land rents, but enjoys a lower cost of improving public
services. If the imitation costs M are too small to satisfy (20), the city will not
innovate in the current period but will instead imitate in the next period. The
closer the imitation costs to the innovation costs, however, the less attractive is
imitation.
If the imitation costs are so close to the innovation costs as to make M
satisfy (20), the city will innovate. The gain to the landowners in city B of
switching from imitation in the next period to innovation in the current period
3In a fourth case, (20) holds and (21) does not hold. Such F and M, however, are excluded
in the set which satisﬁes (11) and (12).
4Among B2(1,1), B2(1,0), B2(0,1) and B2(0,0) in the optimization problem equations, we
obtained the ﬁrst three as (13), (16) and (18); we have yet to analyze B2(0,0). In obtaining
conditions (20) and (21) we assumed that B2(0,0) = π(0,0) + δπ(0,0). We can see that
when both cities have bad public services in period 2 and F is suﬃciently large to satisfy
F ≥ δM + 2δ(π(1,0) − π(0,0)), they do not innovate; both innovate if F is so small that
F ≤ δM + 2δ(π(1,1) − π(0,1)). Thus we must check that F ≥ δM + 2δ(π(1,0) − π(0,0))
for each of the three cases. In cases 1 and 3, the inequality holds. In case 2, however, the
inequality does not necessarily hold, and F may be less than δM +2δ(π(1,1)−π(0,1)). With
F so small as in case 2, however, both cities will innovate in period 1. That is, both face the
problem (19), in which there is no B2(0,0).
10is non-negative, but smaller than the loss of the landowners in the rival city. In
particular, when M and F make (20) an equality, the gain is zero (that city is
indiﬀerent between imitation and innovation). Therefore, the sum of beneﬁts
for the landowners in the two cities is smaller when both cities innovate than
when one city innovates and the other imitates. In equilibrium, too many cities
innovate. In addition, a switch from imitation in the next period to innovation
in the current period by city B harms owners of capital. City B can prevent
capital outﬂow by such a switch. Capital owners in city B, however, gain less
than landowners. The reason is that capital mobility makes the price of capital
less sensitive to the gap in the quality of public services than is the price of
land. If only city A innovates, capital in city B moves to city A, and thus capital
owners in city B could also enjoy the higher quality of the public services in city
A. Therefore, even when F is suﬃciently small to satisfy (20), it can exceed the
beneﬁts to capital owners of increased returns of switching from imitation to
innovation. That in turn implies that if a city maximizes returns to landowners,
too many cities may innovate.
In case 1 a Nash equilibrium has pure strategies, but the solution is asym-
metric. We discuss below whether there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium
with mixed strategies.
Suppose that in period 1 the rival city innovates with probability φj. Then
a city’s optimization problem is to
maxφi∈[0,1][φi{π(0,0) − F/2 + δφjB2(1,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(1,0)},
+ (1 − φi){π(0,0) + δφjB2(0,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(0,0)}].
The solution is
if − F/2 + δφjB2(1,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(1,0) > δφjB2(0,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(0,0)
then φi = 1,
if − F/2 + δφjB2(1,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(1,0) = δφjB2(0,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(0,0)
then φi can take any value in [0,1],
if − F/2 + δφjB2(1,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(1,0) < δφjB2(0,1) + δ(1 − φj)B2(0,0)
then φi = 0.
If φj satisﬁes (5.1) in the range of φj ∈ [0,1], then φi = φj = φ is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The beneﬁts to a city are
B1(0,0) = π(0,0) − F/2 + δφB2(1,1) + δ(1 − φ)B2(1,0). (22)
Thus, this economy has a symmetric Nash equilibrium with mixed strategies if
the φ that satisﬁes (22) and (5.1) lies in [ 0, 1 ]. With (13), (16), (18), (22), and
(5.1) we have
−F/2 + φδ(1 + δ)π(1,1) + (1 − φ)δ(π(1,0) + δπ(1,µ))
− φδ(π(0,1) − M/2 + δπ(µ,1)) − (1 − φ)δ(1 + δ)π(0,0) = 0.
(23)
11Let f(φ) denote the left-hand side of (23). It is diﬃcult to obtain φ explicitly
by solving (23), yet we can see that φ ∈ [0,1] if either f(0) ≤ 0 and f(1) ≥ 0, or
if f(0) ≥ 0 and f(1) ≤ 0. The condition f(0) ≥ 0 is the same as (21), and the
condition f(1) ≤ 0 is the inverse of (20). Hence, if (21) holds and (20) does not
hold, two types of equilibria can arise. One equilibrium has asymmetric pure
strategies: one city innovates and the other does not. Another equilibrium has
symmetric mixed strategies: each city innovates with positive probability.
Social welfare in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is
φ2WFF + 2φ(1 − φ)WFM + (1 − φ)2W0. (24)
This value is strictly smaller than WFM, since in (24) the sum of the coeﬃcients
of WFF, WFM and WO is 1, and WFM is the largest of the three. That is,
in contrast to the Nash equilibrium with asymmetric pure strategies, in a Nash
equilibrium with symmetric mixed strategies, the social optimum WFM cannot
be attained. The socially optimal solution has one city innovate and the other
imitate. In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, however, this solution appears
only with probability 2φ(1 − φ) < 1. With probability φ2, too many cities
innovate; with probability (1 − φ)2 no city innovates.
5.2 A city maximizing the income of capital owners
Consider next the equilibrium when each city maximizes the income of capital
owners, or maximizes (6), given the rival city’s strategy.
Let Vt denote the maximized beneﬁts to a city from period t on, which are
functions of the qualities of public services in the two cities in the starting period
t.
As in section 5.1, we ﬁrst consider the game between cities in period 2. If
both cities provide good public services in period 2, the cities cannot further
improve public services. Thus V2(1,1) becomes
V2(1,1) = r(1,1)/2 + δr(1,1)/2. (25)
Consider next the equilibrium when each city maximizes (6) given that only one
city initially provides good services. The problem facing the city with the bad
services is to
max[r(0,1)/2 + δV3(0,1),r(0,1)/2 − M/2 + δV3(µ,1),
r(0,1)/2 − F/2 + δV3(1,1)] = V2(0,1).
It chooses to imitate if
M + δ(r(1,1) − r(µ,1)) ≤ F, (26)
and
δ(r(µ,1) − r(0,1)) ≥ M. (27)
Its beneﬁts are then
V2(0,1) = r(0,1)/2 − M/2 + δV3(µ,1) = r(0,1)/2 − M/2 + δr(µ,1)/2. (28)
12Given that the city with initially bad services imitates the city with good ser-
vices, the city with good services has beneﬁts
V2(1,0) = r(1,0)/2 + δr(1,µ)/2. (29)
Therefore, if (27) holds, the Nash equilibrium has the city with worse services
imitate. Their beneﬁts are (28) and (29). The set of (F,M) which satisﬁes
(26) includes the one which satisﬁes (11) and (12). However, (27) does not
necessarily hold. In this sub-section, we suppose (27) holds; in the Appendix
we suppose it does not.
With (25), (28) and (29) in hand, we can turn to the original problem (6).
Given that the rival city innovates, a city’s optimization problem is to maximize
[r(0,0)/2 − F/2 + δV2(1,1),r(0,0)/2 + δV2(0,1)]. (30)
The city innovates if
F ≤ δM + δ(r(1,1) − r(0,1)) + δ2(r(1,1) − r(µ,1)). (31)
In contrast, when the rival city does not innovate, a city’s problem becomes to
maximize
[r(0,0)/2 − F/2 + δV2(1,0),r(0,0)/2 + δV2(0,0)]. (32)
The city innovates if
F ≤ δ(r(1,0) − r(0,0)) + δ2(r(1,µ) − r(0,0)). (33)
Three equilibrium patterns are possible, depending on whether (20) and (21)
hold:
1. Equation (33) holds and (31) does not hold. Then the Nash equilibrium
has only one city innovate. The beneﬁts to the city that innovates (say
city 1) are
r(0,0)/2 − F/2 + δr(1,0)/2 + δ2π(1,µ)/2.
The beneﬁts to the city that does not innovate are
r(0,0)/2 + δr(0,1)/2 − δM/2 + δ2r(µ,1)/2.
2. Equations (31) and (33) both hold. Then both cities innovate. The ben-
eﬁts are
r(0,0)/2 − F/2 + δr(1,1)/2 + δ2r(1,1).
3. Neither (31) nor (33) holds. Then neither city innovates. The beneﬁts to
each are
r(0,0)/2 + δr(0,0)/2 + δ2r(0,0)/2.
13In case 1, the social optimum is attained. In cases 2 and 3 the social optimum
is not attained. In case 2, too many cities innovate. In case 3, in contrast, no
city innovates.
Figure 3 shows the areas in which each of the cases holds. We see that when
the socially optimal outcome has one city innovate and the other imitate, in
equilibrium innovation hardly takes place. The price of capital in one city rises
following an innovation in that city, but not by as much as the land rent rises.
Furthermore, an innovation in one city can raise the price of capital and lower
the price of land in the other city. Therefore, a city which maximizes the income
of capital owners has smaller incentive to innovate than a city which maximizes
the income of landowners.
6 Redistributive policy by federal government
As seen in section 5.1, which discussed cities maximizing the incomes of land
owners, too many cities may innovate. We consider here how the central gov-
ernment redistributive policies aﬀect the results. Let ˜ π denote returns after
redistribution:
˜ π(1,µ) = λπ(1,µ) + (1 − λ)π(µ,1),
˜ π(µ,1) = (1 − λ)π(1,µ) + λπ(µ,1),
where λ represents the degree of redistribution: λ = 1 represents no redistri-
bution and λ = 1/2 represents extreme redistribution such that the returns are
equalized.























When equation (35) holds and (34) does not, only one city innovates. Con-
ditions (34) and (35) imply that increased redistribution reduces innovation.
Thus, when F is suﬃciently small and so too many cities innovate, redistribu-
tive policy will lead to the social optimum.
7 Conclusion
Competition across cities is often seen as a “race to the bottom,” with each city
fearing that high taxes will drive capital to other cities. Our analysis looked at
the opposite eﬀect: a city can attract capital by providing better services than
its neighbor does. One reason for the diﬀerence in the results is that much of the
literature on tax competition supposes that tax revenue is used for redistribution
from the rich (or from capital owners) to the poor. We instead see tax revenue
14as used to improve services which increase the productivity of capital. Some
such policies, such as education, may even appear to be redistributive. Our
second contribution to the large literature on tax competition is to compare
outcomes when a city aims to maximize returns to landowners to outcomes
when a city aims to maximize returns to landowners. Both cases generate
externalities across cities. In maximizing returns to local owners of capital, the
city ignores how its policies will raise the returns to capital earned by residents
of the other city. In maximizing returns to local landowners, the city ignores
how its policies will reduce the returns earned by landowners in the other city.
These externalities work in opposite directions, with the cities induced to spend
either too little or too much on improving services.
158 Appendix
Consider the solution when (27) does not hold, and thus the city with worse
services does not imitate in period 2. Then V2(1,0) and V2(0,1) are not (28)
and (29) but are the following:
V2(0,1) = r(0,1)/2 + δV3(0,1) = r(0,1)/2 + δr(0,1)/2. (36)
Given that the city with initially bad services imitates the city with good ser-
vices, the beneﬁts to the city with good services are
V2(1,0) = r(1,0)/2 + δr(1,0)/2. (37)
A city’s optimization problem given that the rival city innovates in period 1
is the same as (30). Since, however, V2(1,0) and V2(0,1) are (36) and (37), the
condition under which the city innovates becomes
F ≤ δ(1 + δ)(r(1,1) − r(0,1)). (38)
A city’s optimization problem given that the rival city does not innovate in
period 1 is the same as (32), but the condition under which the city innovates
is
F ≤ δ(1 + δ)(r(1,0) − r(0,0)). (39)
If equation (39) holds and (38) does not hold, the Nash equilibrium has only
one city innovate. The other city will not imitate in period 2. If equation (38)
and (39) both hold, both cities innovate. If neither (38) nor (39) holds, then
neither city innovates. In any case, the social optimum is never attained.
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